# Dualism Dualism is the view that mind and body are fundamentally different kinds of things. René Descartes' substance dualism held that mind (thinking substance) and body (extended substance) are separate substances that interact through the pineal gland. [[Gilbert Ryle]] famously dismissed this as the "ghost in the machine"—a category mistake. Modern property dualism ([[David Chalmers]]) accepts physical monism but holds that consciousness involves non-physical properties. Dualism faces the interaction problem: how can non-physical mind causally affect physical body? Yet physicalism struggles with [[Qualia]] and [[Consciousness]]—why there is subjective experience at all. [[Thomas Nagel]] argues that purely physical descriptions cannot capture what it's like to be conscious. The debate remains central to [[Philosophy of Mind]]. ## Types of Dualism | Type | Claim | |------|-------| | **Substance dualism** | Mind and body are different substances (Descartes) | | **Property dualism** | Physical world, non-physical mental properties (Chalmers) | | **Predicate dualism** | Mental predicates irreducible to physical | ## References - Descartes, R. (1641). *Meditations on First Philosophy* - Chalmers, D. (1996). *The Conscious Mind* ## Related - [[Philosophy of Mind]] - [[Consciousness]] - [[Gilbert Ryle]] - [[David Chalmers]] - [[Functionalism]] - [[Qualia]]