# Embodied Cognition Embodied cognition challenges the classical view that the mind is a disembodied computer manipulating abstract symbols. Instead, cognition is deeply shaped by the body—its sensorimotor systems, physical interactions, and situatedness in the environment. Thinking isn't just in the head; it's distributed across brain, body, and world. Key figures include George Lakoff, Francisco Varela, Alva Noë, and [[Hubert Dreyfus]]. The view emerged as a critique of [[Computational Theory of Mind]] and classical AI. Evidence includes: conceptual metaphors grounded in bodily experience (Lakoff), motor system involvement in understanding action words, and the role of gesture in thought. Embodied cognition influenced robotics, situated AI, and critiques of the [[Symbol Grounding Problem]]. The body isn't just input/output—it's constitutive of mind. ## Core Claims | Claim | Implication | |-------|-------------| | Cognition requires a body | Disembodied AI limited | | Concepts are grounded in sensorimotor experience | Abstract thought built on bodily metaphors | | Mind extends into environment | "Extended mind" thesis | ## References - Varela, Thompson, Rosch. *The Embodied Mind* (1991) - Lakoff & Johnson. *Philosophy in the Flesh* (1999) ## Related - [[Hubert Dreyfus]] - [[Symbol Grounding Problem]] - [[Computational Theory of Mind]] - [[Philosophy of Mind]] - [[Enactivism]]