# Enactivism Enactivism holds that cognition arises through dynamic interaction between an organism and its environment—mind is not in the head but enacted through bodily engagement with the world. Introduced by Varela, Thompson, and Rosch in *The Embodied Mind* (1991), it draws on phenomenology (Merleau-Ponty) and biology (autopoiesis). Knowing is inseparable from doing. Enactivism goes beyond [[Embodied Cognition]] by emphasizing that perception and action are fundamentally coupled—we perceive in order to act and act in order to perceive. It challenges representationalist views ([[Computational Theory of Mind]]) that treat mind as manipulating internal symbols. Related to [[Hubert Dreyfus]]'s critique of AI and the [[Symbol Grounding Problem]]. ## Core Claims | Claim | Implication | |-------|-------------| | Cognition is embodied | Requires a body | | Cognition is enacted | Emerges from action | | Cognition is embedded | Situated in environment | ## References - Varela, Thompson, Rosch. *The Embodied Mind* (1991) ## Related - [[Embodied Cognition]] - [[Hubert Dreyfus]] - [[Symbol Grounding Problem]] - [[Philosophy of Mind]]