# Functionalism Functionalism is a position in [[Philosophy of Mind]] that defines mental states by their functional roles—what they do, not what they're made of. Pain, for instance, is whatever state is caused by tissue damage, causes distress, and motivates avoidance behavior. This allows the same mental state to be realized in different physical systems (multiple realizability): humans, aliens, or computers could all feel pain if they have the right functional organization. Functionalism was developed by [[Hilary Putnam]] and [[Jerry Fodor]] in the 1960s as an alternative to both [[Dualism]] and reductive materialism. It became the dominant view in cognitive science, supporting the computer metaphor of mind. Critics argue it ignores [[Qualia]]—the subjective "feel" of experience. A functional duplicate might behave identically but have no inner experience (the philosophical zombie problem raised by [[David Chalmers]]). ## Key Concepts | Concept | Description | |---------|-------------| | **Multiple realizability** | Same function, different substrates | | **Causal role** | Mental states defined by causes/effects | | **Machine functionalism** | Mind as software on hardware | ## References - Putnam, H. (1967). "The Nature of Mental States" - Fodor, J. (1968). *Psychological Explanation* ## Related - [[Philosophy of Mind]] - [[Hilary Putnam]] - [[Jerry Fodor]] - [[Consciousness]] - [[Qualia]] - [[Dualism]]