# Intentionality Intentionality is the "aboutness" or "directedness" of mental states—the property by which thoughts, beliefs, and desires are *about* something. My belief that Paris is in France is *about* Paris; my desire for coffee is *directed at* coffee. Franz Brentano (1874) argued intentionality is the mark of the mental—what distinguishes mind from mere matter. The concept is central to debates about AI and consciousness. [[John Searle]]'s [[Chinese Room Argument]] claims computers lack intentionality—they manipulate symbols without understanding what they're about. The [[Symbol Grounding Problem]] asks how symbols acquire intentionality. Note: intentionality (aboutness) differs from "intention" (purpose/plan), though they're related. ## Key Points | Point | Explanation | |-------|-------------| | Aboutness | Mental states refer to things | | Mark of the mental | Brentano's thesis | | Original vs derived | Minds have original; symbols have derived | ## References - Brentano, Franz. *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* (1874) - Searle, John. *Intentionality* (1983) ## Related - [[John Searle]] - [[Chinese Room Argument]] - [[Symbol Grounding Problem]] - [[Philosophy of Mind]] - [[Intention (MoC)]]