# Nature of mental processes The nature of mental processes—thinking, perceiving, reasoning, remembering—is a core question in [[Philosophy of Mind]]. Are mental processes computational (information processing), biological (brain states), or something else entirely? [[Jerry Fodor]] argued for computational functionalism: the mind is a computer running symbolic operations. Connectionist approaches model cognition as neural networks without explicit symbols. Key debates include: whether mental processes are conscious or mostly unconscious, whether they require representations, and how they relate to brain activity. [[Daniel Dennett]] describes mental processes as "multiple drafts" of parallel processing; [[Patricia Churchland]] argues they'll be explained by neuroscience. The question connects to AI: if mental processes are computational, machines could think. ## Key Views | View | Proponent | |------|-----------| | **Computational** | [[Jerry Fodor]] | | **Connectionist** | Rumelhart, McClelland | | **Neuroscientific** | [[Patricia Churchland]] | ## References - Fodor, J. (1983). *The Modularity of Mind* - Churchland, P.S. (1986). *Neurophilosophy* ## Related - [[Philosophy of Mind]] - [[Consciousness]] - [[Jerry Fodor]] - [[Functionalism]] - [[Cognitive Science]]