# Gilbert Ryle ![[50 Resources/51 Attachments/51.03 Public/2026-05-04 Gilbert Ryle.jpg|400]] Gilbert Ryle (1900–1976) was a British philosopher who served as Waynflete Professor of Metaphysical Philosophy at Oxford. His 1949 book *The Concept of Mind* attacked Cartesian [[Dualism]], famously dismissing it as the "ghost in the machine"—the mistaken view that mind and body are separate substances. Ryle argued this commits a "category mistake": treating mental concepts as if they named hidden inner processes rather than dispositions to behave. Ryle's work laid groundwork for [[Functionalism]] and ordinary language philosophy. He influenced [[Daniel Dennett]] and the broader move away from introspectionist psychology toward behavioral and functional analyses of mind. His concept of "knowing how" vs "knowing that" remains influential in epistemology and cognitive science. ## Key Contributions | Concept | Description | |---------|-------------| | **Ghost in the machine** | Critique of mind-body dualism | | **Category mistake** | Logical error of treating concepts wrongly | | **Knowing how/knowing that** | Distinction between skills and propositions | ## Quotes <!-- QueryToSerialize: LIST FROM #type/quote AND [[Gilbert Ryle]] WHERE public_note = true SORT file.name ASC --> ## Books <!-- QueryToSerialize: LIST FROM #type/book AND [[Gilbert Ryle]] WHERE public_note = true SORT file.name ASC --> ## References - Ryle, G. (1949). *The Concept of Mind* - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gilbert_Ryle ## Related - [[Philosophy of Mind]] - [[Dualism]] - [[Functionalism]] - [[Daniel Dennett]] - [[Behaviorism]]